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December 7, 2012 
Health Care Reform Issue Paper  
 
Ethical Issues in the Drug Approval Process 
 
“I’m disappointed the commissioner has chosen to take the hardest line possible . . . for some 
women, the decision was nothing short of a death sentence”  
            - Terrence D. Kalley, husband of woman taking Avastin. The New York Times (Pollack 2011) 
 
“It is the right decision for women and for science. We all wished the drug worked. It does not”  
            - Frances M. Visco, president of the National Breast Cancer Coalition. The New York Times (Pollack 2011) 
 
 
Americans have been led to believe that a pill can cure everything and anything. Any 
pain, discomfort, affliction, or allergy can be fixed or alleviated with one small tablet. What 
happened to “An apple a day keeps the doctor away”? Today, Americans want to see their 
doctors in order to receive prescriptions for drugs. With so many drugs on the market it is 
important to pay attention to how these drugs are being produced and the regulated trials they 
must undergo before they can be released to the public. Clinical trial research is used in order to 
test the safety and efficacy of new medical treatments. By nature, clinical trial research involves 
human subjects, which means that ethical issues will always exist. One of the current ethical 
debates surrounding the drug approval process is the growing tension between making sure drugs 
are safe and the speed at which drugs can be sent to market. Proponents of safety argue that drug 
approval is not something that should be rushed, while proponents of speed argue that the faster 
drugs make it to market, the more lives that will be saved because people can actually use them. 
The case studies of Vioxx and Avastin illustrate the ethical and practical dilemmas in the drug 
approval process. I argue that new drugs for terminally ill patients, for which no better known 
treatment exists, should be made available to those patients as quickly as possible, including 
using streamlined approval, provided that patients are made clearly aware of the difference 
between research and treatment.  
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The Origins of Expedited Review  
 The age of expedited development and accelerated approval of new drugs began in the 
1980s as a reaction to the emerging AIDS epidemic. Before this time, as mandated by the 1962 
amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), all new drug applications 
had to undergo three phases of clinical trials and had to be approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). It was estimated that this process took an average of eight years to 
complete and cost more than 50 million dollars per drug (Greenburg). While the new drug 
approval process was time consuming and costly, the 1962 amendments were welcomed at the 
time because of concerns about thalidomide. Thalidomide was a drug that a German 
pharmaceutical company had marketed as a sleeping pill, but was later found to be associated 
with the birth of thousands of malformed babies in Western Europe (Promoting Safe and 
Effective Drugs for 100 Years 2006). Although the Medical Officer of the FDA had fortunately 
kept thalidomide off the U.S. market, the American public was eager to support stricter 
regulations on pharmaceutical companies. When the AIDS epidemic began to grow, becoming 
the leading cause of death for U.S. men ages 25-44 in 1992, FDA regulations designed to protect 
patients, by properly evaluating risks and ensuring that new drugs were safe before they were 
released to the public, became seen as a hindrance to progress and a suppression of patient 
autonomy (Anderson 2011). The ethics of the entire drug approval process became very different 
when patients, such as those with AIDS, were terminally ill: “Terminally ill patients lacking 
effective conventional treatments confront a risk-benefit determination very different from that 
of the general public. Such patients have far greater incentives than the larger public to gather 
their own information and to take risks” (Greensburg). AIDS patients utilized these incentives 
and began to organize. Organizations, including the Gay Men’s Health Crisis started in 1982, 
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and the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) established in 1987, led protests and 
demonstrations in order to pressure the FDA into changing its policies. In response to this 
pressure, the FDA adopted many new drug approval reform measures, including “Treatment IND 
(Investigational New Drug)” and “Accelerated Approval” regulations. “Treatment IND” 
regulations, promulgated in 1987, made experimental drugs available to patients, physicians and 
manufacturers when certain conditions were met, including that the drug was designed to treat a 
serious or life threatening condition and no other treatment options existed (Greenburg). 
“Accelerated Approval” regulations, instituted in 1993, built on previous “Subpart E” 
regulations, which enabled early and constant collaboration between the FDA and a 
pharmaceutical company developing a life saving drug so that Phase III Trials could be bypassed 
if enough information was gathered. The “Accelerated Approval” regulations allowed “surrogate 
endpoints”, or intermediate biochemical effects of a new drug, to be used as a final basis for 
FDA approval, provided that post-marketing studies were pursued to ensure effectiveness and 
safety (Greensburg). Therefore, life saving drugs can be approved for treatment based on one 
clinical effect. In 1997, Congress codified the FDA’s accelerated approval regulations by 
enacting Section 506 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (Decision of the 
Commissioner 2011).  
 The ramifications of these new regulations were far reaching, affecting far more than just 
the AIDS population. They opened the door for further debate about whether or not the FDA 
regulations expedited the approval process too much, compromising patient safety, or whether 
the regulations should be stricter in ensuring patient safety is met prior to sales. The two drugs 
that will be described in this paper serve as tangible examples of this controversy. Vioxx, a pain-
reliever for arthritis approved by the FDA in 1999, was pulled from the market five years after 
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being released because it was shown to cause an increased risk of serious cardiovascular events. 
Avastin, a drug used to treat several types of cancers, was granted accelerated approval by the 
FDA in 2008, under the regulations developed in 1993, to treat metastatic breast cancer, but later 
had this early approval revoked. Both cases highlight the pros and cons of the expedited approval 
process, which will be discussed in greater detail in the rest of the paper. The Vioxx recall 
highlights (1) the ethics of clinical trial research itself, (2) the evaluation of risks versus benefits 
of any new treatment, (3) the growth of Contract Research Organizations (CROs) and (4) the 
ethics of post-marketing research. The Avastin story contrasts the lessons learned from the Vioxx 
recall, specifically the evaluation of risks versus benefits. I use these contrasting issues to support 
my argument that expedited approval is ethical and should be used to get drugs to terminally ill 
patients as quickly as possible, provided that patients are made clearly aware of the difference 
between research and treatment.  
Vioxx 
  Merck is a successful global pharmaceutical entity that has much experience in the field 
of drug development. In 2009, Merck was ranked second of the top fifteen Global Pharma 
Corporations, falling only behind Pfizer (Pharma and Biotech Industry Global Report). By May 
of 1999, Merck had successfully completed the development, testing and proper marketing of a 
new drug to treat arthritis pain, Vioxx. Vioxx was an important drug for Merck because it was to 
compete with Celebrex, Pfizer’s new drug to treat arthritis pain. Additionally, the Vioxx sales 
came at a pivotal time for Merck because patents to four of their major drugs were scheduled to 
expire in 2000 and 2001, meaning that generic equivalents would be allowed to enter the market 
and consequently depreciate Merck’s sales (Presley). Vioxx “was crucial for Merck’s bottom 
line – the high-margin blockbuster prescription drug contributed a fifth of Merck’s profits in 
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2003” (Oberholzer-Gee 2004). On May 20, 1999, the FDA approved Merck’s application for 
Vioxx to be brought to market (Presley). As soon as Vioxx was released, it was an instant 
success: “By the end of 1999, over 5 million prescriptions had been written for Vioxx and it had 
been launched in 47 countries” (Presley). This was more than 22,000 prescriptions per day and 
was mainly because Merck successfully marketed Vioxx to physicians (Presley). Merck desired 
to market Vioxx so heavily because the population was aging and the arthritis market was 
booming. In 1999, analysts expected the market for prescription arthritis drugs to rise from $7.2 
billion worldwide to $13 billion by 2005 (Morrow 1999). Despite gaining FDA approval and 
huge economic success, Merck continued to test Vioxx in post-marketing studies during and 
after its release to see if it had other uses. These post-marketing studies eventually came to 
highlight serious health concerns that would lead to Merck pulling Vioxx from the market.  
In January of 1999, just months before Vioxx received FDA approval, Merck began a set 
of clinical trials known as VIGOR (Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research) to test the 
efficacy and safety of Vioxx compared to its top competitor, Aleve. The goal of the VIGOR 
trials was to compare the gastrointestinal outcomes of patients taking Vioxx (Group A) versus 
those in patients taking Aleve, generically known as naxopren (Group B) (Presley). Merck was 
not forced to pursue these trials, but chose to perform them because the FDA had the power to 
approve what the contents of the Vioxx label. “Although the FDA has limited power to compel 
firms to conduct post-marketing studies, it must approve the labeling for drugs, and it has the 
authority to issue a public health advisory or even recall a product with adverse effects from the 
market, giving it some leverage with manufacturers” (Eisenburg 2005). Merck opposed a study 
that focused solely on cardiovascular risks, but decided “in consultation with the FDA, to 
monitor data on these risks in ongoing studies of new indications, thereby signaling optimism 
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about new markets rather than concern about side effects” (Eisenburg 2005). Merck was not 
alone in conducting post-marketing research, but post-marketing studies are more common now 
than they were in 1999 due to federal legislation passed in 2007 that strengthened the authority 
of the FDA in the post-marketing period. Merck’s VIGOR trial involved 8,000 participants and 
was monitored by a Data Safety and Monitoring Board (DSMB) (Presley). The DSMB noticed 
an increased number of serious cardiovascular events in Group A than Group B, 52 compared to 
29, but they did not know originally whether this was because Group A had received a negative 
side effect or Group B had received a protective side effect. The DSMB requested additional 
safety analysis reports on the cardiovascular events that had occurred before the study was to be 
published. However, these safety concerns were pushed aside by top Merck officials who were 
more concerned with their stakeholders and the fact that Vioxx was their top selling product. For 
example, the President of Merck Research Laboratories, admitted that “safety risks were evident, 
but he hoped that Merck could present the risks as a class effect, or, in other words, present the 
risks so that they appeared common to all drugs that function as COX-2 inhibitors” (Presley). 
Merck was not willing to let one set of trials dictate the future of Vioxx without putting up a 
fight.  
Before the results of the VIGOR trials were even published, Merck’s Marketing and 
Sales team published a statement claiming that the main results of the study were that Vioxx 
produced a significant reduction of serious gastrointestinal events compared to Aleve, 
generically known as naproxen, in patients being treated for rheumatoid arthritis (Presley). The 
statement tried to avoid any concern about increased risk of serious cardiovascular events in 
patients taking Vioxx by attributing the increase to a health benefit received in patients taking 
Aleve: “In addition, significantly fewer thromboembolic events were observed in patients taking 
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naproxen in this GI outcomes study, which is consistent with naproxen’s ability to block platelet 
aggregation” (Presley). Merck attempted to attribute Vioxx’s inability to block platelet 
aggregation as an effect common to all COX-2 inhibitor drugs, even before the study results 
were released to the public. On November 23, 2000, the results published in the New England 
Journal of Medicine showed that patients taking Vioxx were five times more likely to experience 
an adverse cardiovascular event than patients taking Aleve (Presley). The Marketing and Sales 
team continued to be relentless in trying to divert attention and keep the media from catching on 
to the story. For example, they created a reference manual for all their field representatives to 
follow that included a list of tough questions physicians might ask about the study results and a 
set of talking points they could respond with. Even after an FDA committee and a New York 
Times article noted the increased risks of cardiovascular events and questioned the safety of 
Vioxx, Merck continued to stick to its original conclusion that it was due to a protective effect of 
naxopren and that Vioxx was still more advantageous than narcotics for pain management. 
Safety concerns continued to grow however, and eventually Merck was forced to make a 
decision. Merck had continued to test Vioxx in clinical trials for its effects on Alzheimer’s 
disease and colon polyps. However, these studies also revealed safety concerns associated with 
Vioxx. Merck requested an emergency meeting with the FDA on September 28, 2004 to share 
the data gained from these additional studies. In collaboration with the FDA, on September 30, 
2004, almost five years after the original safety concerns had first emerged, Merck decided to 
pull Vioxx from the market (Presley).  
The fact that Merck knew all along about the increased risk of serious cardiovascular 
events in patients taking Vioxx, but continued to sweep the information to the side as they 
promoted their blockbuster drug, shows that FDA regulation is necessary. If the FDA had not 
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been regulating Merck, they would have continued to market Vioxx worldwide in attempts to 
increase their bottom-line, despite the adverse side effects to patients. The expedited approval 
process should be used to bring drugs to market as quickly as possible, as long as appropriate 
regulations, which keep pharmaceutical companies in check, are in place.  
Effects of the Vioxx Recall: Clinical Trial Research 
The Vioxx recall raises several issues about the drug approval process. The first issue is 
whether or not clinical trial research itself is ethical. The use of randomized trials began in the 
early 1950s when streptomycin was evaluated in patients with tuberculosis (Passamani 1991). 
Since then, the process of clinical trials has been greatly revised and refined. In an article in The 
New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Passamini, a doctor from the National, Heart and Lung 
Institute, makes a strong case that clinical trials are the most scientifically and ethically sound 
way to test new drugs (Passamani 1991). He argues that randomized trials, as compared to 
observational studies or a trust in common sense, are the most effective way to prove the safety 
and efficacy of a new drug. He believes that in order to be ethical, clinical trials need to obtain 
informed consent from all patients, give patients the ability to end the study at any time and 
make the patients clearly aware that they are part of an experiment. Additionally, a state of 
clinical equipoise must also exist. This occurs when “a community of competent physicians 
would be content to have their patients pursue any of the treatment strategies being tested in a 
randomized trial, since none of them has been clearly established as preferable” (Passamani 
1991). In the case of the VIGOR trial, neither Vioxx nor Aleve had been shown to be preferable 
for treatment of gastrointestinal issues. Physicians could rightfully and ethically recommend their 
patients take part in this trial because the benefits would outweigh the risks, especially since 
neither group would be receiving a placebo. Passamani notes that one of the common 
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counterarguments is that clinical trials are not ethical because physicians sacrifice the interests of 
their current patients to the interests of all future patients when they ask patients to participate in 
a clinical trial. Passamani argues that this perspective is wrong because in recommending a 
clinical trial as treatment, physicians rightfully weigh the evidence of known therapies versus the 
data that exists about the possibility of new treatments. When treatments have not shown to be 
preferable, it is not unethical to have patients participate in clinical trials in order to assess their 
efficacy. For terminally ill patients, this becomes an even stronger argument. Terminally ill 
patients have a greater incentive to participate in clinical trials because it may be the only 
treatment option they have. The clinical trial research process should be expedited for drugs 
designed to treat terminally ill patients with no other research options. 
Effects of the Vioxx Recall: Evaluation of Risks vs. Benefits 
Although Passamani demonstrates that the concept of clinical trial research is ethical, the 
Vioxx recall raises ethical issues that Passamani fails to consider. For example, Passamani does 
not consider the question of what should be done with the information gained from a trial after 
the trial is completed. In the VIGOR trial, 52 cases of serious cardiovascular events were found 
in the group taking Vioxx. The issue becomes not whether that information was gained ethically, 
but how that information should be interpreted and used in an ethical manner. Is the risk of 
developing a serious cardiovascular event enough to outweigh the benefits of pain and 
gastrointestinal relief? Vioxx was shown to cause increased risk of cardiovascular events among 
certain older patients, but successfully reduced pain due to arthritis in many others. While the 
relative risk for having a heart attack was higher among patients taking Vioxx versus those 
taking Aleve, 0.4% compared to 0.1%, the absolute risk remained how. However, “because tens 
of millions of people in more than 80 countries took Vioxx, this small risk translated into an 
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important public health issue” (Greener 2008). It remains up for debate whether Vioxx should 
have been pulled from the market. Mark Pauly, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, 
believes that the Vioxx recall highlights “the inherent tradeoff between the health benefits of 
taking any drug and the risk of side effects” (Vioxx and Other Painkillers). He makes the point 
that the issue with all new drugs is that, “as more people take the drug, more information about 
side effects is likely to come out. But as more people take the drug, it grows more important to a 
firm's profitability” (Vioxx and Other Painkillers). Vioxx sales reached $2.5 billion in 2003 
(Vioxx and Other Painkillers). Millions of people were taking the drug, making it more likely for 
adverse side effects to be noticed. Merck had strong incentives not to publicize the information 
gained from the VIGOR trial though because it would severely cut into Merck’s sales. However, 
just because a drug is shown to have risks of adverse side effects does not necessarily mean it has 
to be pulled from the market. Pauly points out that, “If all drugs were pulled from the market 
based on the appearance of side effects, there would be no vaccinations for childhood diseases 
that once were killers, or for medications to treat HIV/AIDS” (Vioxx and Other Painkillers). All 
drugs have side effects and risks associated them. The FDA made the judgment call that the risks 
of Vioxx were too severe and outweighed the benefits. While the FDA made an ethical decision 
in this case because patients were protected from the risk of serious cardiovascular events and 
could simply switch to another arthritis drug, such as Celebrex, it would have been an unethical 
decision if it was the only-life saving drug available to terminally ill patients. When patients are 
terminally ill the evaluation of risks and benefits changes significantly. As those with AIDS 
argued in the 1980s and 1990s, expedited approval should be used for terminally ill patients 
because even a small benefit could merit use, despite high risks.  
Effects of the Vioxx Recall: CROs 
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The latest trend in clinical trial research, and another ethical issue surrounding it, is the 
growth of Contract Research Organizations (CROs). The CRO industry emerged in its current 
form in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the CRO industry took off in the 1990s, “rising from 4% 
of R&D spend in the early 90s, to pushing 50% in the mid 2000s” (Walsh 2010). In 2007, there 
were more than 1000 CROs in operation globally and the top four were billion dollar companies 
(Schuchman 2007). The top 10 companies control 56% of the market (Walsh 2010). CROs have 
surpassed academia in clinical research because they can develop and test new drugs with greater 
efficiency. CROs represent one-third of total pharma and biotech spending on drug research and 
development (Brooks 2011). However, questions have been raised about the ethics of CROs 
because “annual CRO-industry revenues have increased from about $7 billion in 2001 to an 
estimated $17.8 billion today” (Schuchman 2007). In 2010, CRO revenue was projected to total 
$20 billion (Brooks 2011). Aside from the growing profits, critics are concerned about the speed 
at which CROs complete research studies. One argument is that quality suffers when more 
emphasis is placed on speed. Pierre Azoulay, an economist at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology’s Sloan School of Management, describes CROs as “‘data-production sweatshops,’ 
where ‘everyone’s very focused on the data,’ rather than on the totality of the knowledge 
required to determine whether a drug is worth pursuing further, and where ‘all the incentives are 
to do [the work] fast’” (Schuchman 2007). However, a study done by Tufts found that CROs still 
turned out high-quality research (Schuchman 2007). CROs highlight the major flaws and 
strengths of the drug development industry today. While too much emphasis on speed and 
deliverables can serve to harm patients and violate ethical standards, when it comes to 
developing drugs for diseases that leave patients terminally ill, speed is essential. Because CROs 
break the trial process down into manageable concrete steps and emphasize swiftness at each 
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step, they are able to produce drugs faster than traditional academic research centers (Schuchman 
2007). I believe CROs and their focus on speed need to be utilized for the development of drugs 
used to treat terminally ill patients. Terminally ill patients generally have few or no other viable 
treatment options. The possibility that a new drug will work, even if it has side effects that are 
found later, is enough reason to push drugs through trials as quickly as possible.  
CROs also highlight the issue of whether the FDA has stringent enough regulations 
within the drug approval process or whether these regulations are more burdensome to the 
process than they are helpful. One of the criticisms of CROs stems from the fact that they are not 
well regulated by the FDA. Since many of the drug regulations that exist were written in the 
1970s before the CRO industry emerged, they do not address CRO accountability (Schuchman 
2007). A pharmaceutical company or sponsor hires a CRO to perform clinical trials, increasingly 
abroad, so that the company does not need to directly provide staff for and organize the trials. 
Therefore, CROs often report any issues found during a trial directly back to the drug company 
that hired them, not to the FDA. However, in turn, drug companies do not always report the 
issues to the FDA. It is unclear where the responsibility for ethical or safety issues falls in these 
cases. Additionally, CROs are even harder to monitor when their trial sites are increasingly being 
sent overseas, where research subjects are more available and less costly (Schuchman 2007). 
Many argue that CROs should be more heavily regulated, especially since their main focus is on 
speed.  
Effects of the Vioxx Recall: Post-Marketing Research 
The Vioxx recall serves as an example of the necessity of FDA regulations and the 
benefits of post-marketing research. While some could argue that the FDA failed to properly 
regulate Vioxx because the drug should never have gone to market in the first place, I agree with 
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the argument that the Vioxx recall should be viewed as a regulatory success story (Eisenburg 
2005). This argument hinges on the fact that drugs resemble information products, such as 
databases, more so than other chemicals (Eisenburg 2005). The goal of clinical trial research is 
therefore information on the efficacy and safety of the drug. Pharmaceutical companies have 
powerful incentives to selectively share the information gathered from clinical trial research. 
However, “FDA regulation constrains these impulses by providing oversight of trial design, 
scrutiny of results by FDA scientists and outside experts, and assurance that marketing claims 
correspond to underlying data” (Eisenburg 2005). In terms of Vioxx, the FDA had limited power 
to actually mandate Merck to conduct post-marketing research trials, but Merck was constrained 
by regulations on off-label marketing and therefore had to pursue further studies after Vioxx was 
already approved for use of arthritis pain. Post-marketing research is valuable in that it can be 
used in conjunction with expedited approval. After expedited approval of a new drug, post-
marketing research can be to gather further data on the safety and efficacy of the drug or replace 
one of the bypassed preliminary trials. In this way, drugs can be brought to market sooner and 
the trials will simply be completed after. The Vioxx recall demonstrates that post-marketing 
studies are beneficial in that they can find new uses of the drug or find adverse side effects that 
may have been missed, overlooked or underplayed before. Additionally, since post-marketing 
studies do not slow down the speed of the drug approval process, they can effectively be used to 
get drugs to terminally ill patients as quickly as possible.  
Final Judgment on the Vioxx Recall 
 The FDA was justified in their decision to require Merck to recall Vioxx from the market. 
Evidence from several clinical trials showed that patients taking Vioxx had an increased risk of 
developing a serious cardiovascular event compared to other pain-relievers. Critics argue that 
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because these adverse effects were only seen in certain segments of the patient population, the 
FDA should simply have required these increased risk factors to be added to the Vioxx label. 
However, the FDA based its decision on reliable evidence and did so to protect the population as 
a whole. Additionally, since Vioxx is only a pain-reliever and not a life-saving treatment, 
following the recall patients could easily switch to a new drug, since there were many others 
available on the market. The FDA’s decision to take Vioxx off the market did not prevent 
patients from receiving treatment for their condition. Instead, it served to protect the millions of 
patients who were taking Vioxx, because the increased risk of serious cardiovascular events was 
undeniable. David Graham, Associate Director for Science and Medicine at the FDA’s Office of 
Drug Safety, “estimates that Vioxx caused between 88,000 and 138,000 additional heart attacks 
or sudden cardiac deaths in the USA, and that 30–40% of patients who suffered cardiovascular 
problems because of Vioxx probably died” (Greener 2008). The FDA used its regulating powers 
appropriately by recalling Vioxx from the market. In this case, the increased risks were not worth 
the benefits. In the case of Avastin, it is a different story.  
Avastin 
Developed by Genetech, Avastin is an antibody that inhibits the biological activity of a 
protein important in the formation of blood vessels. On February 26, 2004, the FDA’s Center for 
Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) approved Avastin as treatment to be used in combination 
with chemotherapy for patients with colon and rectum cancer. On February 2, 2008, CDER 
granted accelerated approval to Avastin in combination with paclitaxel as a treatment for patients 
who have not received chemotherapy for metastatic HER2-negative breast cancer (Decision of 
the Commissioner 2011). Approval was based on the results of E2100, a cooperative group 
randomized trial that showed a 5.5-month increase in progression free survival (Carpenter 2011). 
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The drug was granted accelerated approval solely on the basis of an increase in progression free 
survival because of the high case fatality rate of this type of cancer. Metastatic breast cancer is 
currently an incurable disease and over 90% of patients diagnosed with metastatic breast cancer 
die from it (Decision of the Commissioner 2011). For incurable diseases, prolongation of life 
remains the gold standard for approval of treatments. After FDA approval, Avastin became one 
of the top drugs for treating cancer. The breast cancer market totaled $8.6 billion in 2011 and is 
estimated to rise steadily to $10.9 billion in 2018 (Growth in the Breast Cancer Drug Market). In 
2009, Avastin generated $4.8 billion in annual sales (Herper 2009). Roche, a Swiss 
pharmaceutical company, payed $47 million in March of 2009 to buy the part of Genetech that 
they did not already own because of its blockbuster drug Avastin. Genentech's projections had 
U.S. Avastin sales quadrupling to $10 billion by 2015 (Herper 2009).  
 However, Avastin sales fell short of this estimation, in part because the FDA revoked its 
accelerated approval to treat metastatic breast caner. On November 16, 2009, Genetech 
submitted the results of two additional trials, AVADO and RIBBON1, to the FDA in order to 
apply for regular approval of Avastin to treat metastatic breast cancer. On the basis of the results 
of these confirmatory trials, the FDA can either grant regular approval or revoke the accelerated 
approval. The FDA generally decides to revoke the accelerated approval if the additional trials 
fail to provide evidence that the drug is effective for the indications for which it was approved or 
fails to show that a clinical benefit justifies the risks associated with the use of the product for 
that indication. Both trials failed to confirm the 5.5-month increase in progression free survival 
found in the original E2100 study. AVADO showed an improvement in median progression free 
survival of 0.8 months, while RIBBON1 showed an improvement in median progression free 
survival of 1.2 months. Furthermore, neither study demonstrated that adding Avastin to 
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chemotherapy provided a benefit to overall survival. In addition, patients in the AVADO study 
self-reported that Avastin did not provide an improvement in quality of life (Decision of the 
Commissioner 2011). The FDA decided to revoke Avastin’s accelerated approval because the 
trials failed to demonstrate that the drug was effective and that the clinical benefits outweighed 
the risks. In his final decision on the case, the Commissioner of the FDA stated: “As results from 
these studies have come in, they have substantially changed the profile of this drug. AVADO and 
RIBBON1 have not verified the clinical benefit shown in E2100, and considering all the 
evidence, I cannot conclude that Avastin has been shown to be safe and effective for the 
metastatic breast cancer indication” (Decision of the Commissioner 2011). Genetech exercised 
their legal right to request a hearing, but the FDA’s Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee 
(ODAC) still voted to remove the breast-cancer indication for Avastin. In a Letter to the Editor 
in the New England Journal of Medicine, a member of the committee stated that he made his 
decision because he did not want to hurt patients with a drug that does not work well or to 
provide patients with false hope. He imagines how a hypothetical conversation would go with a 
breast-cancer patient if Avastin was approved to treat metastatic breast cancer: “‘Well, I can 
offer you a drug that will not make you live longer, won’t make you feel better, and may have 
life-threatening side effects, but it will keep your cancer from worsening by an average of 1 to 2 
months.’ Hope? Or false hope?” (Sekeres 2011).  
Avastin: Evaluation of Risks vs. Benefits 
 Similar to their rational behind the recall of Vioxx, the FDA revoked Avastin’s 
accelerated approval because they believed that the risks were not worth the benefits. The 
AVADO and RIBBON1 trials failed to confirm the clinical benefit of progression free survival 
for 5.5 months that was found in the first E2100 trial. Although Genetech argued that the FDA 
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placed too much emphasis on the progression free survival marker and not enough on other 
markers, such as hazard ratios, which were found to be in a similar range to the E2100 trial, the 
FDA stood by its decision. The FDA concluded that the low progression free survival times 
indicate that Avastin is not worth the risk to patients. However, some patients have made the 
argument that despite Avastin’s effect on most patients, it has worked wonders for a certain 
group of “super-responders” (Decision of the Commissioner 2011). They argue that the FDA 
should leave Avastin on the market so that individual patients and their physicians can try the 
treatment and determine if it is right for them. Furthermore, although Avastin will remain on the 
market as a treatment for other types of cancers, so doctors can use it off-label for breast cancer, 
insurers might no longer pay for the drug (Pollack 2011). Costing about $88,000 a year, many 
women would no longer be able to afford it (Pollack 2011). Metastatic breast cancer is a death 
sentence for many women. Similar to those with HIV/AIDS, the risk vs. benefit calculation 
becomes very different in the face of a life-threatening disease. Patients with metastatic breast 
cancer are willing to take great risks if there is a possibility of prolonging their life, even for a 
few months time. They are willing to take the risk because there is a chance that they could be 
one the small group of “super-responders”. For a patient facing imminent death, any chance may 
be worth taking.  
Final Judgment on the Avastin Decision 
The FDA certainly had a difficult decision to make in the case of Avastin. While 
individual anecdotes are moving, they offer the FDA no concrete evidence, which the FDA 
needs to base its decision on. Additionally, “the precedent that [would] be established if the FDA 
[reversed] its decision on withdrawing [Avastin’s] labeling for metastatic breast cancer not 
because of changing scientific evidence, but in response to philosophical and political 
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counterarguments” would hinder the agency’s credibility (Carpenter 2011). However, credibility 
is a small price to pay when patients’ lives are at stake. In The New York Times, Dr. Yashar 
Hirshaut, an oncologist in Manhattan, criticized the FDA for their stringent reliance on evidence, 
despite the fact that patients are suffering from a life-threatening disease and already have 
limited options: “Of course we want everything to be evidence-based. I also like the American 
flag and apple pie. You say, ‘This person is dying right here and I need something that will help, 
and there’s a logical construct that I can see how it will help.’ ” (Kolata 2008). While Avastin 
was not shown to be as effective as was originally thought, the small possibility of prolonging 
life, even by just a month, may be worth the risk for many persons suffering from metastatic 
breast cancer. However, by failing to extend Avastin to regular approval, the FDA prevents the 
majority of patients from accessing the drug because insurance companies no longer have to 
cover it. The FDA should not have revoked Avastin’s accelerated approval because it is a drug 
for the terminally ill. Patients diagnosed with metastatic breast cancer have few other effective 
options and are likely to die from their cancer. Prolongation of life is invaluable to these patients 
and their family members. The FDA must take the nature of the disease into greater account 
when making their decisions. The agency should use a different standard of review when the 
drug being assessed is for terminally ill patients with few or no other options.  
Expedited Approval and Informed Consent 
The FDA should continue to use expedited approval, provided that patients are made 
clearly aware of the difference between research and treatment. Evaluations of the streamlined 
approval process demonstrate that it is both economically and socially beneficial. A 2010 Project 
FDA Report analyzed the use of streamlined approval for three drugs: HAART, for HIV/AIDS; 
Rituxan, for non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma; and Herceptin, for breast cancer. One significant social 
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advantage that the research found was that the early sale of these drugs, due to the streamlined 
approval process, benefited patients far more than it benefited the pharmaceutical firms that 
developed them. For example, Herceptin was worth $137 billion to patients with breast cancer, 
but only $9 billion in profits for the firm (Philipson 2010). Additionally, a developmental process 
that allowed Herceptin to enter the market one year earlier would have increased the benefit to 
patients by $8 billion, a 6% increase (Philipsion 2010). Researchers calculated these economic 
values by using a “willingness to pay” (WTP) model. WTP is influenced by a patient’s income, 
the year in which the disease began and the survival benefits conferred by the drug (Philipson 
2010). It is used to calculate the gross value to the patient of the access to the drug in any 
particular year, and then the net benefit is determined by subtracting the cost of drug itself 
(Philipson 2010). The streamlined approval process is beneficial to patients and therefore should 
be utilized, especially for terminally ill patients.    
However, if patients are not clearly informed about the fact that they are receiving an 
experimental drug for the purpose of research and not a guaranteed treatment, the expedited 
approval process and clinical trial research itself becomes unethical. Dr. Passamani, who argues 
that clinical trial research is the most effective and ethical way to evaluate and overcome 
incomplete information about a treatment, also realizes that “physicians and their patients must 
be clear about the vast gulf separating promising and proved therapies” (Passamani 1991). If 
patients are led to believe they are receiving a proven treatment, the trial consequently becomes 
unethical. For terminally ill patients, who have no other treatment options except to enroll in a 
clinical trial, this distinction becomes even more crucial. Being a research subject is not the same 
as being a patient receiving treatment. While the experimental drug might work, there is also the 
chance that it may not. The most effective way to guarantee that patients are clearly informed is 
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through a comprehensive informed consent process. Under current FDA regulations, “no 
investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research covered by these regulations 
unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective informed consent of the subject or the 
subject's legally authorized representative” (21CFR50 2012). Informed consent is an important 
and necessary part of the clinical trial research process because human subjects are donating their 
time and bodies for the sake of medical knowledge.  
An article in the New England Journal of Medicine suggests a counter argument, that the 
obligation to obtain specific informed consent for research should not be absolute, but should 
“depend on the risk–benefit ratios of the intervention and the alternatives, as well as the degree 
to which the patient would be expected to have preferences about the various options for 
diagnosis or treatment that are under investigation” (Truog 1999) The article argues that in 
certain circumstances a general agreement to participate in research should be used in place of 
the stringent protocol for informed consent outlined by FDA regulations because the requirement 
to obtain informed consent in all clinical research trials is an unnecessary roadblock that prevents 
the easy evaluation of new forms of technology and new interventions (Truog 1999). This 
argument is flawed because a therapeutic misconception of clinical research exists in our society. 
Coined by Paul Appelbaum in 1982, the phrase ‘therapeutic misconception’ describes patients’  
“failure to appreciate the difference between research and treatment” (. Many patients wrongly 
believe that they will be receiving treatment when they agree to participate in a trial, but this is 
not the case. In many cases, they may just be receiving a placebo, or the experimental drug could 
harm them more than help them. There are risks associated with any treatment, even those that 
have been proven safe and effective. However, I argue that patients need and deserve a 
	   21	  
comprehensive informed consent process in order to help them properly understand and evaluate 
the risks of participating in medical research.  
Conclusion  
 The case studies of Vioxx and Avastin highlight several of the ethical and practical issues 
of the drug approval process, including the nature of clinical trial research, the risk-benefit 
analysis of new treatments, Contract Research Organizations (CROs) and the ethics of post-
marketing research. However, they also reveal the fact that no drug approval process is perfect. 
Regulations guiding the drug approval process are subject to historical context, public opinion 
and special interests, just like any government policy. They can and do change overtime, but they 
will always be criticized by any given subset of the population. Additionally, drugs react 
differently depending upon the environmental factors that the person is experiencing and the 
internal conditions that vary from person to person. Regardless of what the FDA decides, it will 
never please everyone. However, I advocate that the FDA should take a patient centered 
approach to the drug approval process. First, the FDA should continue to use accelerated 
approval and work to streamline the approval process further, since it has been shown to benefit 
patients greatly. Second, the agency should continue to utilize the comprehensive informed 
consent process. If in the future they can eliminate the therapeutic misconception about research, 
by better educating patients about the difference between research and treatment, only then 
would I advocate for streamlining or removing the informed consent process. Until then, patients 
need to be made fully aware of their role as a research subject. Although the FDA will always be 
blamed and criticized, if they use streamlined approval and informed consent, at least they will 
have the patients’ best interest at heart.  
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